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Arrival
This chapter is borne to the harbour of my being on three currents. The first, a series
of gentle swells on the phrase “in re”, is manifested thus far in one published article,
a second in press, and a third in preparation [5–7]. The second is a more enduring
stream of thought deriving from the writings ofWilliam James and John Dewey. And
the third, with which I shall begin, is a pool that formed and flowed from California
in 2012.
The Stanford Symposium
In February of 2012 Stanford University hosted a symposium devoted to the teaching
of composition at the doctoral level in the United States. Nine distinguished teachers
from major institutions critiqued student works, joined in round-table discussions,
and presented papers setting forth their own perspectives and philosophies. The latter,
together with an overview of the entire event, were published inContemporary Music
Review [11, pp. 249–329].
Talent and Skill
Erik Ulman [34] prefaced the papers themselves with a summary that stressed the
diversity represented in pedagogy and curriculum. But in fact all the participants
appeared to agree on at least one key point: the practice and therefore the teaching of
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composition includes (or has been thought to include) two quite distinct components.
Mark Applebaum [1], the instigator of the symposium, put it thus: “Can talent be
taught? I suspect not. . . . We can, however, teach skills” (p. 262). Fred Lerdahl
[24] offered a similar assessment: “Instruction in music composition divides roughly
into two parts: teaching craftsmanship and guiding a student toward his or her own
path. The first can be taught, but the second is a mysterious undertaking” (p. 291).
Shulamit Ran [27] argued that “an ideal composition teacher, at any level, is (1) able
to help the student listen, critically, and in a deep way, to his/her own music, and (2)
considers it a priority to develop and refine the kind of technical tools that will help
the student implement his/her personal artistic vision” (p. 307). AndRogerReynolds’
[29] more general description rested on a similar dualism: “I feel it is essential for
every creativemusician to developwhat Iwill call—in a general sense—a ‘way’. This
is not simply a matter of compositional techniques, characteristic ways of handling
pitch, temporal, and timbric resource, for example. It also implies a path from initial
impulse to final product; a path that allows a composer to be confident that s/he can
proceed with moderate certainty under any circumstances, whatever the resources
available, whatever the nature of the desired musical end” (p. 319).
Others approached this duality from a more personal perspective that called clean
distinctions into question. Martin Bresnick [2] discussed the difference as embodied
in his two principal teachers: John Chowning, who directed him to the technical
dimensions of sound itself, andGyörgyLigeti,whodemandedoriginality to the extent
of asking for the impossible. The implication was that Bresnick’s own compositional
self was born only from the integration of these two components. Scott Lindroth [25]
also drew on examples from his own studies; he recalled an “inscrutable” teacher and
opposed this with one who offered “advice on details of orchestration, counterpoint,
texture, proportions, and the like” (p. 298). He argued that advanced students benefit
most from a third approach, in which a teacher seeks to cause them to, in effect,
lose their ways, their habits. Chaya Czernowin [13] went much further, arguing that
all such pedagogical manoeuvres are beside the point, because “every separation
between means or technique on one hand and expression or concept or idea on the
other is totally false” (p. 285).
History and Diversity
A second recurring issue concerned the place of historical precedent: to what extent,
if any, ought students be knowledgeable about existing musics, and what should
these be? On such questions there was a clear division of opinion, which Ullman
[34] summarised thus: “While some in various ways maintained that the Western
musical tradition could or should retain its privileged curricular status, others wanted
to identify a core less with this or any other body of work and practices andmore with
abstract principles assumed to be more fundamental or desirable” (p. 263). Ran [27]
was the most uncompromisingly and unrepentantly conservative: “In a deep sense,
Bach and Beethoven, Schubert and Brahms, and so many other great composers
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whose music has withstood the test of time, were my greatest teachers. (As were
Stravinsky, Bartok, Schoenberg, Berg, Varèse, the list only begins.) I believe this is
so not because this music forms an important tradition, though of course it does,
but because it is GREAT MUSIC. Call me old-fashioned, but I continue to consider
this kind of training—engaging with great music in any way possible—invaluable”
(p. 306). Applebaum [1] was perhaps the most sceptical: “Maslow’s ‘law of the
instrument’ warns us that poverty of imagination is the consequence of a narrow
palette: If all you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. . . . Still hanging
about like a miasma is the perpetually re-inherited idea that literacy in Western art
music and the ability to do tonal harmony are necessary. . . . I remain queasy about
the notion that just because I had to learn how to use a hammer, so should you”
(pp. 262–263). Edmund J. Campion [9] cast the historical net more widely with a
question that approached belligerence: “[Are you] going to compose inside today’s
accepted modes of musical expression or are you going to create by exploring and
researching emerging music practices?” (p. 280).
Applebaum’s and Campion’s critiques rested on the observation that today’s envi-
ronment is characterised by a diversity of styles and experiences; students bring
other tools than “hammers” to their studies. Lerdahl [24] concurred, but he drew the
opposite conclusion: “I firmly believe in traditional instruction in ear training, tonal
harmony and counterpoint, tonal analysis and standard instrumentation and orches-
tration. Such instruction is important for two reasons. First, one learns from the central
tradition. . . . Second, contemporary music has not coalesced into a common practice
in which basic principles of musical organization are agreed upon. Instead, there
are many styles and compositional methods, and each composer must find his or her
way through the maze” (p. 292). Lindroth [25], too, advocated conventional training,
but primarily “for the inexperienced composer” (p. 299). And Czernowin [13] again
pushed the argument much further, looking beyond “practices” and “styles” to focus
on “authenticity”: “We have endless numbers of common practices, to such a degree
that we have actually no common practice at all. . . . Thus, the main problem today
is not how to become very good at one or more of these styles, working within a
style. It is also not the act of choosing a style or a combination of styles. Today . . .
the main problem has to do with the question of authenticity” (p. 284).
Inner and Outer
These two issues would seem to arise from a single source, a sense that composition
partakes of two worlds: the internal (talent, an authentic “voice”) and the external
(technique, historical understanding). The relationship between the internal and the
external, in several composers’minds, would seem to be a circular one—an imprecise
and fluctuating loop, a kind of feedback, in which internal impulses produce external
actions and external stimuli produce internal responses.Czernowin andBresnick both
implied such a process, but Reynolds [29] presented it explicitly: “Composition is an
undertaking of cyclical character: from an initial decision or urging toward a creative
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act; through the mulling over of resources, scale, form, media, and so on; through the
writing out of a score of some sort; then interaction with performers and performance
spaces in rehearsal; the performance itself, and finally the reconsideration over time
of how the performance ‘felt’ in relation to what one intended. . . . Every stage
in the cycle matters, but what matters most is that one engages with the process
in a committed and individual manner. . . . And the more such cycles a student
goes through attentively, and, ideally, interactively with a thoughtful observer—a
mentor—at hand, the faster one’s craft, one’s ‘voice’, emerges and refines itself”
(p. 316).
One thinks of Charles Ives [19], ranting about inner “music” going out and outer
“sound” coming in: “My God! What has sound got to do with music! . . . Why
can’t music go out in the same way it comes in to a man, without having to crawl
over a fence of sounds, thoraxes, catguts, wood, wire, and brass?” (p. 84). Or, in
a more moderate moment, attempting to steer a middle course between conformity
and rebellion: “Why tonality as such should be thrown out for good I can’t see. Why
it should always be present I can’t see. It depends . . .on what one is trying to do, and
on the state of the mind, the time of day or other accidents of life” [20, p. 117].
Martin Bresnick [2], discussing the place of history in composition, attempted a
similarmiddle course: “The repertoire ofWesternmusic [is] taught bymusic theorists
and musicologists . . . It seems to me crucial that this valuable historical repository
be reclaimed by composers for their own creative purposes” (p. 272). And from this
one gets not to Ives but to John Cage, speaking to Richard Kostelanetz in 1968: “We
must get ourselves into a situation where we can use our experience no matter what
it is. We must take intentional material, like Beethoven, and turn it to non-intention”
[23, p. 58].
Cage and Ives; the exteriority of sound; the interiority of music; the cycle that
flows first outward, then inward; the reconstruction of history by and into an authentic
self; the very concept of music as useful experience—all these suggest that these
currents of thought draw on the wellspring of American pragmatism, especially on
the writings of John Dewey andWilliam James. Bresnick [2] links himself explicitly
to such forbears: “This empirical, pragmatic approach is, I think, largely anAmerican
attitude, whose origins may be found in Emerson, Whitman, William James, John
Dewey, and many others. . . . John Chowning discreetly and transparently taught
me his way of working—by the vivid example of his excitement in discovering
new sounds, his new ways of sounding them, and by his openness to thoughtful
experiment. The value of these efforts was not always immediately apparent: things
failed, or proved, in practice, to be ineffectual or unnecessary. . . . I remain convinced
by this sort of ‘materialist,’ empirical approach to composition” (p. 271).
Bresnick’s leap is not surprising. Most of the composers at Stanford were
Americans, after all, and many situated their work in relation to (if not as part of)
so-called “experimental” music. But they spoke of this only indirectly; the focus
of the symposium was their educational approach and philosophy. “Experiment”,
“empirical”, “experience”, “education”—these are key terms in writings by the
pragmatists, and they played an important part in the Stanford discussions. And
pragmatists—Dewey, especially—were deeply concerned with how experience is
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made into knowledge, or art, and how knowledge or art is embedded in experience.
That is a prime educational preoccupation, andDewey exercised a profound influence
in America on what became known as “progressive” education, in which attention to
individuality, “authenticity”, plays a central role. It seems almost inevitable, really,
that a gathering of eminent American teachers of creative practice (composition)
would invoke, often indirectly, the progressive thinking that flowed through much
of American culture during the previous century; and it thus seems quite reasonable
that probing their discourse for underlying issues leads to a terrain where Dewey,
James, and the pragmatic tradition of thought are plausible guides.
But what, exactly, are the points of contact? Where are the resonances, and what
the struck sound? And what can this have to do with POINT—temporally and geo-
graphically distant and in no way conceived as an educational project?
Pragmatism
There is certainly historical evidence for a link between pragmatismand experimental
music. The link between Cage and Deweywas explored by Joan Retallack, writing in
1992. “Cage’s work . . .unfolds within the American pragmatist tradition character-
ized by the aesthetic theory of the philosopher John Dewey”, she writes [28, p. 243],
and Dewey reappears regularly in the analysis of Cage’s “poethics” that follows. In a
later essay, Austin Clarkson [10] explored the relationship between Cage’s “oriental”
aesthetic and William James, mediated by Jung and Suzuki. I myself have touched
on this topic [3, 4], and Edward Crooks’s superb dissertation [12] explores some of
the hidden Western sources in Cage’s “oriental” influences.
For Ives there is a surprising gap—possibly because he himself is so resolutely
focused onEmerson that other philosophers have gotten short shrift. But four decades
ago Rosalie Sandra Perry [26] tied Ives to James and pragmatism in a seminal
chapter; and more recently Christopher Bruhn’s fine dissertation [8] has picked up
and extended the threads. Suffice it to say that there is ample reason to stipulate
kinship, if only because both Ives and James trace their lineage to Emerson.
In what follows I will leave such historical matters untouched. I propose rather to
discuss the four key terms noted above—experiment, empiricism, experience, and
education—with particular reference to James and Dewey, secondary links to the
Stanford conversations and, eventually, a return to the POINT project.
Experiment
I first encounteredGerhardNierhaus and thePOINTproject at theOrpheus Institute in
Ghent,Belgium.TheOrpheusResearchCentre, atwhich I have been a senior research
fellow since 2009, has fostered an extensive examination of the term “experiment”
in recent years, particularly as applied to artistic research in music. The scientist-
philosopher Hans-Jörg Rheinberger provided one model for exploration [31]; I have
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approached the problem with reference to experimental music [5]; and recently
Katharine Coessens brought Friedrich Steinle to initiate a discussion of “exploratory
experimentation”, based in part on Goethe’s experimental work with colour [30, 32].
It is no wonder, then, that in drafting the present chapter my thought has drifted to
these three ongoing Orpheus conversations and the implications they might have for
POINT. All three approaches can be mapped crudely but convincingly onto opposi-
tions between inner and outer that somewhat resemble the dualism that underlay the
Stanford symposium. Rheinberger distinguishes, crucially, between “experiment”
and “experimental system”; the latter—the constellation within which the former is
manifested—embraces laboratory, social relations, economic factors, and uncounted
other forces. The “experiment”—historically a self-contained idea that arises from
the mind, from “pure” thought, and is then tested in a “material” world—thereby
becomes a much messier thing. The “system” in which it is embedded feeds into
the construction of the “idea”; thought ceases to be “pure”, and the “material” is
constantly reconfigured in a series of cycles inwards, outwards, and around the puta-
tive “scientist”. The attractiveness of this model to researchers in artistic practice is
evident.
Similarly, in my analysis of “experimental music”, I found it useful to distinguish
between “test” and “observation”. The former, I argued, is associated with judgment
and value; a test determines the validity of a concept or hypothesis that is formed, in
effect, in the mind prior to the experiment. “Observation”, on the other hand, entails
activities undertaken with relatively few preconceptions, and hypotheses (if any) are
formed only after the experiment has occurred. Tests are responses to questions of
the form “Is it the case that . . .?”; observations arise from “What happens if . . .?”
Test and observation are two halves of a cycle that (anticipating Dewey) we might
call experience: the test points outward, from self to world, while observation feeds
the self from the world.
This is very like the distinction that Steinle and others have drawn between
“theory-driven” and “exploratory” experimentation. An experiment driven by theory
is determined entirely by a set of predicted outcomes; anything that does not bear
on the prediction is ignored. Newton, Steinle argues [30], worked in this manner in
evolving his theory of optics: each confirmed prediction gave rise to a new hypothesis
to be subjected to experiment (and thus confirmed); if a prediction was disproved,
it was the theory (not the experimental experience) that was subjected to exami-
nation. “Exploratory” experiment, on the other hand, as practiced by Goethe and
others, freely accumulates data within a bounded universe, a “topic”; only after (or
in the course of) this open, observational praxis are relationships and consequences
inferred.
In all three models, then, there is a rough and slippery distinction between inner
and outer actions and the orders in which they are undertaken.Without plunging into
the abyss of metaphysics, it is useful to speak of mind and world, idea and reality.
To the extent that pragmatism was a response to the non-negotiable conflict between
“idealism” and “realism”, it effectively sidestepped the import of this distinction
without denying it: mind and world, idea and reality form a cycle, a closed system
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of mutual effects that are apprehended through actions and their consequences—
practical actions: pragmatism.
Empiricism
Today three philosophers are accepted as the patriarchs of pragmatism: Charles
Saunders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. All three embraced a form of
empiricism in which our inner world of judgment, thought, and intelligence is con-
tingent upon an outer world—an apprehended reality. But the contingent process was
not simple observation; the mind does not stand above, apart from the outer world,
determining properties and rules by applying an innate (inner) logic. The mind is
part of the world, and part of the body, and part of the act of sensation; the world
is apprehended by action and by consequence: an entity is what it is because some-
one does things to it (or in it) and observes the result. This is a kind of exploratory
experimentation, with principles arising from a variety of acts undertaken not quite
at hazard. Other than temporal continuity, spatial proximity, and the biological laws
of sensation (the “principles of psychology”, one might say [21]) there is no need to
assume a priori properties.
Peirce, James, and Dewey differed in important respects. Peirce came to call
his thinking “pragmaticist”; James embraced “pragmatism”, having taken the term
from Peirce originally; Dewey preferred “instrumentalism”. For Peirce the essential
problem was meaning; for James, arguably, it was truth; and for Dewey it was
learning (or, in the present context, creativity). Peirce was led inevitably to the
construction of a semiology; James was required to confront belief; and Dewey
devoted himself to society, education, and art. But the thought of all threewas radical,
as James applied the term: all three argued that the subject of the inquiry could not
be separated from the inquiry itself. The meaning of “meaning” must be explicated
using the properties that “meaning” has come to acquire. An explanation of creativity
has to account for the creation of the explication. And even empiricism, James argues,
must be radical: “the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations
that are themselves parts of experience” [22, p. xiii].
“Radical”, too, are the constructions of “experiment” presented above. Rhein-
berger’s “experimental system” must include the prevailing models for experimen-
tation that underpin the laboratory work. But the “experimental system” is itself one
such model; thus it enters the world it is describing and hence must account for its
own being. Similarly, what Steinle calls “exploratory experiment” (and what I have
called “observation”) arises only out of its own practice. Tests, which are “theory-
driven”, arise from principles that are assumed to exist in a different realm from the
objects beingmanipulated: the law of gravity has no effect on themotions of the plan-
ets. Exploratory experimentation, in contrast, is intrinsically vague and amorphous,
itself being constantly reshaped in response to what is observed; the construction
of an exploratory experiment—of the term itself—is itself an exploratory experi-
ment. Experimental systems and exploratory experiments are inextricably entangled
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in the shifting relations of the self with the world around it, and those relations are
themselves part of the system constructed, the domain explored—in a word, part of
experience.
Experience
And so we come to “experience”, and—in this context—especially to John Dewey’s
summative work, Art as Experience [16]. In this Dewey applies the principles of rad-
ical empiricism to artistic expression and esthetic (Dewey’s spelling) understanding.
Consistent with the pragmatic method, he begins by refusing a priori distinctions—
in particular, the distinction between “fine” art and daily life. As an illustration, he
observes that “the intelligent mechanic, engaged in his job, interested in doing well
and finding satisfaction in his handiwork, caring for his materials and tools with
genuine affection, is artistically engaged” (p. 5). It follows that art resides not in
objects—paintings, buildings, sounds—but in experiences: “Even a crude experi-
ence, if authentically an experience, is more fit to give a clue to the intrinsic nature
of esthetic experience than is an object already set apart from any other mode of
experience” (p. 11).
The first problem, then, is to examine experience. Again Dewey starts from a
tabula rasa: the only assumption is that experience is necessary to life, and “life goes
on in an environment; not merely in it but because of it, through interaction with it”
(p. 13). In that sense experience is continuous and indivisible. But we speak of having
an experience—something that is bounded and extracted from the continuity. What
creates the boundaries? The pragmatic answer is that we do, by the way in which
we direct our attention, the actions we take. We judge something complete, and we
attend to something else, something “new”. Recall James: relations between “parts
of experience” are themselves part of experience; and a relation called “completion”
arises, becomes part of experience, when we feel we have begun something different.
“We have an experience”, Dewey writes, “when the material experienced runs its
course to fulfillment” (p. 35). We ascribe to an experience a unity, a distinguishing
quality or qualities that sets it apart from others; and when that unity or quality
changes fundamentally, we declare the experience complete. An experience need
not be continuous—cooking a meal might be interrupted by a phone call, or reading
a novel halted for days or weeks—but in naming or characterising the experience,
such interruptions are disregarded: it is the unifying quality that binds the experience
together, not temporal continuity.
But within an experience, “every successive part flows freely, without seam and
without unfilled blanks, into what ensues” (p. 36). In that sense an experience is just a
part of life; an experience results from “interaction between a live creature and some
aspect of the world in which he lives” (p. 44). The interaction proceeds cyclically,
in an alternation of states that Dewey characterises as “doing” and “undergoing”;
and from this arises the flow, the unity of an experience. “A man does something;
he lifts, let us say, a stone. In consequence he undergoes, suffers, something: the
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weight, strain, texture of the surface of the thing lifted” (ibid., my italics). The
experience consists not merely in the sequence of events but in the binding unity
formed by the relationship between them: “An experience . . . is not just doing and
undergoing in alternation, but consists of them in relationship” (ibid.) (Recall James,
again).
But since Dewey situates art not in objects but in experience, it follows that
“art . . .unites the very same relation of doing and undergoing, outgoing and incom-
ing energy, that makes an experience to be an experience” (p. 48). Some experiences,
however, have qualities that we designate as “esthetic”, and Dewey distinguishes
these from others that are “dominantly intellectual or practical” (p. 55). In the latter
sort of experience, an end is attained; from the start, the goal is to bring the experi-
ence to a useful conclusion, and the experience has no value other than as a means
to the end. The experience, we might say, is “theory-driven”; it has no “exploratory”
properties, and it includes nothing that has not been anticipated. In an “esthetic”
experience, in contrast, doing and undergoing stand in a relationship that is itself of
value; the artist and the percipient come to explore a process, not to attain an end.
Our interaction with the world, Dewey summarises, “is peculiarly and dominantly
esthetic . . .when the factors that determine anything which can be called an experi-
ence are lifted high above the threshold of perception and are made manifest for their
own sake” (p. 57). Thus an esthetic experience or artistic product is only incidentally
about an image, a theme, or a character; at its heart it is about experience itself.
Hence the value of esthetic experience does not lie in tangible accomplishments,
though these may arise in the course of the experience. We may do something new
or make a new object; we may learn something about a place, about a person, about
form, harmony, design; but above all we learn above all how to experience things
esthetically. All experience is recursive in some sense; an experience becomes a
part of future experience; so for a pragmatist, we might say, esthetic experience is
radically esthetic.
Education
Having been led to learning through art, we are invited into the domain with which
Dewey is perhaps most widely associated: educational theory. Dewey’s engagement
with education persisted throughout his career, beginning with his early, exploratory
experiments at the “laboratory school” at the University of Chicago. These culmi-
nated in Democracy and Education [14], which became a touchstone for “progres-
sive” education in the United States. But Dewey revisited the topic intermittently for
the rest of his life, and he wrote a key summary in 1938, just four years after Art as
Experience. In this—Experience and Education—he critiqued the schism between
“traditional” and “progressive” education and implicitly linked education with art by
means of the term his titles had in common: experience.
Experience and Education is less formal than the earlier volumes, and Dewey
assumes an understanding of some concepts that he had previously explained at
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length. Experience is, as before, an interaction of an organism with its environment;
and, as before, interaction includes the two aspects that Dewey called “doing” and
“undergoing” in Art as Experience. But Dewey’s concern is now less with the bound-
aries of an experience andmore with the continuity formed by experience as a whole.
It is in this continuity that the basis for a critique of education is found, for “every
experience both takes up something from those which have gone before andmodifies
in some way the qualities of those which come after” [17, p. 27]. People learn from
experience, and learning is therefore continuous; the question, for Dewey (as for the
composition teachers at Stanford), is how to distinguish an educational experience
from the learning that happens, willy-nilly, all the time.
Growth—development—also happens continuously, and in some ways would
seem to be equivalent to education. But, Dewey observes, some growth enhances
future growth, and some hinders it; if the hindrance is too great, the organismwithers
and eventually dies. Hence, the key question is: “Does [a] particular form of growth
create conditions for further growth, or does it set up conditions that shut off the
person . . . from the occasions, stimuli, and opportunities for continuing growth in
new directions?” (p. 29). Dewey’s answer is unequivocal: “When and only when
development in a particular line conduces to continuing growth does it answer to the
criterion of education” (ibid.; italics original).
This is a radical education closely allied to radical empiricism and radical esthet-
ics. In all three domains attention is focused not on objects but relations, not on ends
but on processes. These processes are cyclic: experiences—the common basis for
all three enquiries—are evaluated by whether they include, enhance, advance future
experiences. When they do not—when experience is divorced from the environment
and situated solely within the self—empiricism becomes idealism, esthetics become
formalism, education becomes training. “The most important attitude that can be
formed”, Dewey writes, “is that of desire to go on learning” (p. 49).
Not all education, not all experience, is radical in this sense. We live much of our
lives by habit, a topic that Dewey [15] and James [21, v. 1 Chap.4] both treated at
length. Habits are necessary and beneficial; they are acquired through experience and
theymay result in art. But they are not radically esthetic or educational, except insofar
as one can speak of acquiring a habit of inquiry or a habit of esthetic engagement.
Workaday habits—walking, talking, eating, grooming, resting—do not hinder an
organism’s growth, but neither do they further it; they merely maintain it. They are
beneficial, but they are not educative.
There are, however, experiences that are not beneficial—experiences that are mis-
educational or counter-esthetic. Dewey gives several examples in both domains,
and they are remarkably similar. From Experience and Education [17]: “A [mis-
educative] experience may be such as to engender callousness; it may produce lack
of sensitivity and of responsiveness. Then the possibilities of having richer experi-
ence in the future are restricted. . . . [It] may increase a person’s automatic skill in a
particular direction and yet tend to land him in a groove or rut; . . . [it] may be imme-
diately enjoyable and yet promote the formation of a slack and careless attitude [that
modifies] the quality of subsequent experiences so as to prevent a person from getting
out of them what they have to give” (pp. 13–14). And from Art as Experience [16]:
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“The enemies of the esthetic are neither the practical nor the intellectual. They are
the humdrum; slackness of loose ends; submission to convention in practice and
intellectual procedure. Rigid abstinence, coerced submission, tightness on one side
and dissipation, incoherence and aimless indulgence on the other, are deviations in
opposite directions from the unity of an experience” (p. 40).
Stanford Revisited
With rhetoric like this we are led back to the discussion at the Stanford symposium.
The problem there—how to teach composition—integrates both of Dewey’s con-
cerns, the esthetic and the educational. And certain of Dewey’s insights illuminate
the points of contention at Stanford. Recall that Dewey rejected an a priori distinction
between “fine” art and what might be called the arts of life [33]; how does this affect
the Stanford dichotomies between “talent” and “skill”, between “art” and “craft”?
If “the intelligent mechanic” is artistically engaged, can we not say the same of the
intelligent composer writing, say, species counterpoint? When would we not want
to say that?
For a pragmatist, all depends on the nature of the experience. If the counterpoint
is an exercise and only an exercise, then the activity does not further growth and
is not truly educational; if the experience does not illuminate experience itself, it is
not truly esthetic. But the same might be said of a composer determined to display
an original “talent”, a distinct “voice”: if display is the purpose, experience is not
“lifted high” and the work is not esthetic. It does not matter what kind of work is
undertaken; from an educational perspective, the experience is worthy if it enhances
the potential for future growth, and from an esthetic perspective, the experience is
worthy if elevates the understanding of experience. The two amount to very nearly
the same thing: an esthetic experience is usually educational; and an educational
experience, if concerned with musical composition, will, in general, be esthetic.
Much the same applies to the place of historical repertoire in teaching. Indeed,
Dewey addresses exactly this point, more broadly, in Experience and Education.
First he observes that when one attends to any phenomenon, the attention occurs in
the present. Pragmatically speaking, then, there is no necessary difference between
encountering a phenomenon that has been encountered before and one that is entirely
new; the experience can be educational—or esthetic—in either case.Moreover, expe-
rience produces “a continuous spiral”, Dewey written, an “inescapable linkage of the
presentwith the past”, inwhichan experience,when completed, becomes “the ground
for further experiences” [17, p. 97]. Again, the educational value resides in the nature
of the experience: if one studies Bach in order to have studied Bach (for example, to
pass an examination), the experience is not educational; but if the experience of study-
ing Bach leads forward “into an expanding world of subject-matter” (p. 111), it is. A
similar argument applies to esthetic value. Shulamit Ran pleads passionately for the
study of an historical repertoire “because it is GREATMUSIC” [27, p. 306]; but the
greatness resides not in the object—the “music”—but in the experience. Acquiring
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technique or knowledge from the study of “Bach” will probably not be esthetically
satisfying, and themusical experiencewill be something other than “great”; but when
the experience ofBach’smusic brings experience itself to the fore, greatness happens.
Finally, the underlying tension between “inner” and “outer” worlds at Stanford
also appears in pragmatism, as we have seen. But to a pragmatist there is no rea-
son to take sides; organisms and environment interpenetrate in unending cycles of
doings and undergoings—music “going out” and “coming in”, wrote Ives—that
constitute experience, whether educational or esthetic. This is precisely the model
for composition that Roger Reynolds put forth, with the additional suggestion that
the educational experience is enhanced if a “thoughtful observer—a mentor—[is]
at hand” [29, p. 316]. Again, however, the experience itself must be the touchstone
for educational value: if the experience is such that the mentor remains needed for
future work, it has restricted growth, and it is mis-educative; but if the experience
enables a student to grow in new, unanticipated ways, independent of the mentor, it
is profoundly educational.
In sum, it would seem that the deliberations at Stanford invoke and continue a
long-standing discourse—now a century old—about “progressive” education. And
because the education, in this case, concerns music, they also shed light on the
interconnection between esthetics and education that Dewey implied in his two sum-
mative volumes. The teachers who gathered at Stanford are engaged in processes
of exploratory experiment—in tandem, collectively, and in sequence, individually.
They proceed not from an a priori theory by which to teach composition but rather
from a theory—a reflective analysis—that develops from experience and that con-
stantly evolves as one experience succeeds another. The teacher grows along with the
student; both are educated. The objective is the creation not of objects with specific,
approved properties but of experiences—experiences that are both esthetic and edu-
cational, experiences that enhance the qualities of future experiences and that enable
growth in “an expanding world”. The nature of these experiences cannot be specified
in advance without severely limiting their potential; any music that results is, in that
sense, and regardless of its surface features, experimental music. And the associated
education, leading and following, interpenetrating cyclically with the work that is
done, is experimental education.
As is, I will now claim, the POINT project.
The POINT Project
What is the POINT project, viewed through the lens of pragmatism?
In the final section of this chapter I will argue, first, that the technical roots for
POINT extend deep into the bedrock of experimental music, but that POINT can be
distinguished from many of its predecessors by the type of experiment it manifests.
Second, I will suggest that the philosophical roots for POINT reach back to radical
empiricism and that it formalises, in a sense, the pragmatic concept of experience,
especially as explained by Dewey; because of this, the POINT project is linked
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with the issues raised at Stanford. Third, I will claim that POINT results in esthetic
experiences—music, if you will—that arise in ways consistent with Dewey; in this,
too, it serves to illuminate some points of discussion at the Stanford symposium. And
finally, I will suggest that POINT is, at its foundation, a pedagogical tool, one that
pertains not only to the teaching of composition but also to the agenda of progressive
education, one that is of interest not only to the composers and researchers involved
but to a much wider community of practitioners.
POINT and Experimental Music
In POINT, algorithms are devised and employed to make musical compositions. One
can argue that the foundations of algorithmic composition are lost in history—that a
canon, after all, is a kind of algorithm, and that the first notated algorithmic music is
“Sumer is icumen in”. But the term is more usually associated with a compositional
practice that began in the1950s and thatwas from theoutset associatedwith thephrase
“experimental music”. That was the title of Lejaren Hiller’s seminal publication [18],
recounting the first attempts at computer-assisted composition, and it has persisted
to the present in institutions like the University of Illinois’s “experimental music
studios”.
As I have shown elsewhere [5], however, “experimentalmusic” immediately came
to mean two different things. On the one hand, in the work of Hiller and other
practitioners like Milton Babbitt, the “experiments” conformed to classic “theory-
driven” models. A hypothesis was formed and tested by means of an algorithm; this
was predicted to produce results possessing specified properties, and if it failed to do
so, it was rejected. On the other hand, in thework of JohnCage and others, algorithms
(forCage, chance procedures)were employedprecisely because their outcomes could
not be predicted. The result was to be experienced esthetically regardless of its nature.
Cage’s experimentation entails “observation”, in opposition toHiller’s “tests”; and
this, I have said, is similar to the opposition between theory-driven and exploratory
experimentation. But the two are not exactly equivalent. In Cage’s work, each
“experiment”—each “piece”, if you will—stands apart from the others; each is suffi-
cient unto itself. There is no need to generalise; in fact, generalisations—theories—
are assumed to undermine the value, the individuality, of future experiments. In
exploratory experimentation, in contrast, a series of experiments are conducted, not
quite at hazard and sharing a single field of inquiry (though this may be very vaguely
defined). At some point (also vaguely defined) the experimenter brings all the out-
comes together to form a theory, a conception of the whole. This theory can then be
(but need not be) the basis for subsequent “theory-driven” experiments.
The latter model is used in POINT. An algorithm is devised, applied, and
evaluated—but not with the objective of testing or altering the algorithm (though
changes may be made) but with the objective of clarifying the objective. “Oh!” the
composer says, upon experiencing the outcome, “that’s interesting, but I think I must
have meant something different”. Or, perhaps, “Oh! that’s really unexpected; let’s
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see where it goes”. The goal to be attained at the end of the series of experiments is,
at least in part, determined during the course of the experiments themselves.
From the perspective of the participating composer, the process is therefore one
of exploratory experimentation. From the perspective of the researcher, the process
is also exploratory, but on a larger scale. No two composers are alike; for each
different algorithms are needed, and each composer’s own exploratory process is
distinctive. In aggregate, the composers form a collection of experiments that share
a single field of enquiry—algorithmic composition of music—but do not constitute
an orderly route to a pre-determined goal. What is the “theory” that unifies all the
compositional acts, all the algorithms? We don’t know—certainly at the beginning,
and quite possibly even at the end.We can be assured only that new relations between
“parts of experience” will be observed and that these will themselves be factors in
the generation of future experiments.
POINT and Experience
I have just paraphrased William James’s characterisation of radical empiricism.
POINT is radically empirical because at every stage the relations between its
“parts”—whether components of a computer program, musical outputs, or com-
poserly responses—are taken into the experience upon which the next iteration will
be based. Indeed, POINT formalises this process; one might even say that it for-
malises experience in the abstract. Doing and undergoing—which normally form a
fluid continuity, mediated only by the senses—are split by technological interven-
tion: the composer “does” only bymeans of the computer; the composer “undergoes”
only in response to the computer. This split creates clear divisions in the stream of
experience: there is an experience (an algorithm is devised), then there is another (an
output results), then a third (the composer responds), and so forth. A certain kind of
relation—beginning and ending—is elevated, within experience in general, to a dom-
inant position; and at the boundary, the point at which one experience ends and the
next begins, there occurs a change inmedium: fromcomputer code tomusical score to
verbal discourse, cycling forward. The participating composer is placed in a situation
[17, p. 39] that enables self-awareness about the way experience is experienced.
The experience of the researcher embraces a much broader field of interactions,
but again these are formalised in a way that creates distinct boundaries between
experiences. One composer departs, another arrives: the boundary creates two dif-
ferent experiences. Each of these, in turn, can be parsed into distinct units, as above;
the whole can be thus, in this instance, structured hierarchically. Think of a visit to
an art gallery: “Les Demoiselles d’Avignon” names an experience, bounded by the
frame around the painting, that is contained within an experience named “gallery 2”,
bounded by walls and doorways, that is contained within an experience named “the
Museum ofModernArt”, bounded by entering and exiting a building. But experience
need not be nested in this way; we could equally think of a single, unbroken experi-
ence: the journey through the gallery—steps, stairs, pauses, turns.Howweexperience
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the experience is determined pragmatically, perhaps arising from the question asked:
“Where did I go?” requires something quite different from “What did I see?”.
Movement between these experiential poles—the discrete and the continuous
(with all possible gradations between)—occurs constantly and is itself part of expe-
rience. It occupies a central place in conventional models of composition, such as
those put forth at Stanford: the composer is concerned with materials, the com-
poser is concerned with form; the work is comprised of parts, the work constitutes
a whole; the music is experienced in isolation; the music is experienced in relation
to other music. Self-awareness of one’s behaviour, moving forwards and back along
these spectra, is assumed to be beneficial, and a teacher serves in part to encourage
such self-awareness. By juxtaposing a strictly hierarchical experience with an intu-
itive, fluid one, POINT provided participating composers with an opportunity for
structured self-scrutiny, a situation in which they could work upon their method of
working.
POINT and the Esthetic
POINT makes no assumptions about the nature of compositional materials. A com-
poser starts from an image; very well, the computer will start from an image. A
composer starts from a series of intervals; very well, the computer will generate
such a series. Artistic creations—musical works—are not constrained by technical
attributes; esthetic experience can occur in the presence ofmusic of any type.Dewey’s
mechanic, “engaged in his job, interested in doing well and finding satisfaction in
his handiwork”, would recognise POINT as a useful and adaptable tool.
In that sense, POINT is a kind of work-desk for a composer, or a laboratory
for a researcher: it constitutes an “experimental system” that includes equipment, a
working method, and designated roles for participants, the whole intertwined with
an environment that extends to social and economic concerns. It itself would seem
to have no esthetic qualities, other than those experienced in using any well-made
tool—a brush, a knife, a skillet. It is in the results that are produced—the “outputs”
of the project—that the esthetic will be experienced.
But if this is all that matters for POINT, the project as a whole is simply directed
towards the production of “music”; it is goal-directed—the sort of experience that
Dewey characterised as “dominantly intellectual or practical”. In effect, the project
becomes merely a mechanism for composing music, and an obvious question arises:
why bother? Composers do perfectly well on their own; what need have they for
POINT? If the esthetic experience of a work created in POINT cannot be differ-
entiated from that of a work created elsewhere, from a pragmatic perspective the
experience is the same, and POINT is irrelevant.
Clearly something else is at work here; POINT is more than a work-desk, more
even than an experimental system. POINT is not of value because it results in compo-
sitions that can be esthetically experienced; POINT is an esthetic experience in itself.
The participating composer interacts with the experience of composing, not merely
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with an environment made up of compositional materials and other familiar entities.
In an esthetic experience, Dewey requires [16, p. 57], “the factors that determine
anything which can be called an experience are lifted high above the threshold of
perception and are made manifest for their own sake”. And that is precisely what
happens in POINT. The esthetic experience forms (informs, transforms, re-forms)
future esthetic experiences—because POINT is about experience, not about music.
In this respect, POINT helps to explain the underlying unease in Stanford. Most
of the teachers gathered there were not entirely comfortable with a pedagogical focus
on tools and skills—how to hold the pencil, how to edit the sound-file, how to write
invertible counterpoint. Many argued that the skills needed to change, to be reshaped
to suit the current situation; but nearly all indicated that instruction in composition
should also include something quite different—“talent”, “voice”, “a ‘way’.”. But they
were often at a loss to explain how to teach this. POINT helps us to understand that
the two objectives are not, after all, sides of a single coin; they are wholly different
species. In one case, teaching composition is a matter of production; it is goal-
directed, skill-based, tool-specific. Composers learn how to make something. In the
other, teaching composition is a matter of experience; it is open-ended, exploratory,
experimental. Composers learn how to experience making something. No one denies
the necessity for both; but only the latter leads to the esthetic.
POINT and Education
In a practical sense, POINT—like any research project—is concerned with the pro-
duction of knowledge. New algorithms are written, new compositions come into
being, new dialogues are had. New books, chapters, paragraphs are written. The
knowledge enters the environment, and (one hopes) people use it. In this way POINT
enriches a field of study, a domain of interactions.
But from Dewey’s perspective an enriched domain is not in itself educational; all
depends on what is done with it. Unless the interactions are such that the organism—
the student—is enabled to grow further, in “an expanding world”, they merely
preserve established habits or, worse, impose additional restrictions on behaviour.
In particular, an experience that leads to no questions, that simply provides the neces-
sary answers, is not educational. One uses satellite navigation to obtain instructions
for travel; these might be informative, but they are not educational. But when one
uses a map, there arise possible questions about routes, terrain, and connections; in
pursuing these, one obtains not just information but new insights, new possibilities.
A cyclist setting out to explore an area wants a map, not a GPS device. The latter tells
you “how to”; the former invites “what if”. The latter is goal-directed, the former is
exploratory.
For that reason, if POINTwere only its “results”, it itself would not be educational
even if the results subsequently were used educationally. A participating composer
who, through experiencing POINT, arrived at a definitive method for writing music
and then used that method religiously for the indefinite future would, in fact, have
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been mis-educated by the experience. POINT is educational precisely to the extent
that the circular process that animates it has no destination. The objective is to
keep moving, to continue seeking an objective; the “results”—the compositions, the
algorithms—are merely breadcrumbs dropped to mark the journey’s path.
For the participating composers, then, POINT is educational not because they
acquire insights into what they do but rather because they are led to speculations
about what they might do. Self-knowledge is valuable primarily because it enables
one to become other than what one is: it engenders growth. The experiments within
POINT enter the field of past experiences and intermingle with their predecessors,
establishing new relations between “parts of experience”. To the extent that these
relations are exploratory, in pursuit of an ever-receding theory, new experiences will
be educational. And, not incidentally, these experiences will have a potential for
producing artistic work, the basis for new esthetic experiences to be had by others.
For the esthetic—like POINT, like education—is not realised in completed objects;
it is found in experiences that fold back on themselves, that enrich the possibility of
future esthetic experiences.
For the researcher, too, POINT’s educational value does not lie in its accomplish-
ments. Unexpected problemsmay have arisen and been overcome; newprogramming
solutions may have been devised; new interfaces may have been built. These are well
worth reporting and disseminating; they, too, enrich a field of study. But they are also
best approached as an incomplete set of exploratory experiments: incomplete, first,
because new composers will generate new problems, and there is no end to com-
posers; but incomplete also because the set of relations between the solutions—the
new “parts of experience”—and the greater environment raises new enquiries. It is
not so much that “further research will follow”—that is merely a platitude—but that
further research will be constantly transformed in an interactive cycle that is actually
a (re-)application of the model applied in POINT itself. Education is viable to the
extent that it reflexively and sustainably generates education; POINT is educative to
the extent that it generates a further “POINT” in which it is itself a component.
And so also for the greater community of artists and researchers. POINT is
educative to the extent that it invites continuation in new areas and new ways. We
learn nothing if we take it as “finished”. Future POINTs could simply move to new
domains: one can easily imagine analogous projects for writers, for choreographers,
for film-makers. Butwith such extensions POINTveers dangerously close tomethod,
to doctrine; the experimental domain is enlarged, but the work is in some sense repli-
cated. Rather, POINT—as an entity, not a collection of results—needs to enter the
domain of discourse about artistic method, artistic research, artistic apprehension.
There it can enter into new relations with other projects assembled, not quite arbi-
trarily, into a field for exploration, for experimentation.
A world of experience awaits.
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Departure
At the outset I spoke of “the harbour of my being”. This was not just a poetic gesture:
the metaphor is a true one. I am a harbour. My being—the water of the harbour—
interpenetrateswith the sea around it. In certain directions (from certain perspectives)
the sea and the harbour cannot be clearly distinguished; still, there is another world,
outside of the harboured self, with which I interpenetrate. Currents—tides—at times
carry that other to me; at other times they carry me to it. There is undergoing and
there is doing.
The harbour is, however bounded; reality has its limits. In both cases, the
true boundary is the shore—the change from one state to another—and the world
“beyond” is unknowable. The water cannot know the land: it only feels the land’s
constraint. It can lap gently or rage openly, but it gains access only by small, unno-
ticeable increments. And when access is gained, it takes the land into itself; water is
a universal solvent. Thus I transcend myself, utterly unaware.
The other boundary—the vague, shifting edge between harbor and sea—is open
to adventure. I can truly embark; the harbour can empty itself. To engage with the
sea, I must abandon my habits: I must open myself to currents, forces, I cannot
foresee. The adventure is founded on faith, an indefensible belief that understanding
will result; but I commit myself—my self—thereby to being all at sea. There is no
return except by fortune.
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